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Abstract. Conventionally, mutual entity authentication is seen as the
necessary precursor to the establishment of a secure connection. How-
ever, there exist examples of cases where authentication is not needed.
The purpose of this paper is to consider this proposition, illustrated by
case studies, and to use the findings of this investigation as input for
the design of authentication protocols suitable for use in future Internet
access environments supporting ubiquitous mobility.
1 Introduction
In the context of secure communications, mutual entity authentication is very
commonly seen as the necessary precursor to the establishment of a secure con-
nection. However, there do exist examples of cases where mutual authentication
is not necessary, and, indeed, may impose unnecessary overheads on session es-
tablishment. The purpose of this paper is to consider this proposition, using
case studies as the basis for this discussion. In these case studies we consider
the protocols used in the GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications1)
and 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project2) mobile telecommunications
systems.
The main application context of these discussions covers the case where there
are three entities involved in the authentication exchange: a mobile user, a lo-
cal AAA (Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting) server, and a remote
(home) AAA server. That is, the mobile user wishes to set up some kind of se-
cure link with a ‘local’ network (with its own AAA server), and the mobile user
has a long term cryptographic relationship, typically backed up by some kind of
contractual and payment arrangement, with a remote (home) network and AA
server. This ‘roaming user’ model is not only becoming an increasingly common
model for Internet access, but it is also fundamental to understanding the air
interface security system for present day mobile telecommunications networks
(e.g. GSM and 3GPP).
The purpose of this paper is not so much to talk about GSM and 3GPP, but
to consider what more general lessons can be drawn regarding future protocol
design. In particular, how best should authentication and/or access security be
1 http://www.gsmworld.com
2 http://www.3gpp.org
designed in the scenario where a mobile user wishes to access the Internet via a
multiplicity of different network types? The recently inaugurated IETF PANA
(Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access3) work will provide a
general framework for the exchange of authentication messages in this mobile
scenario, but will not address the question of exactly how access security should
operate. Other relevant work includes the ongoing IST-Shaman project4.
2 Entity authentication and key establishment
Before proceeding we need to establish some terminology. We use definitions
from the Handbook of Applied Cryptography (HAC), [1], and, where relevant,
we indicate the relevant section number from the HAC in brackets after the
definition.
Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured of the iden-
tity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually
participated (10.1.1). Either one or both parties may corroborate their identi-
ties to each other, providing, respectively, unilateral or mutual authentication
(10.1.2).
We are particularly concerned here with the case where a protocol simul-
taneously provides entity authentication (unilateral or mutual) and session key
establishment, where this session key (or keys) is used to protect data subse-
quently transferred. Key establishment is a process or protocol whereby a shared
secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent cryptographic
use (12.2.1). Key authentication (sometimes also called implicit key authentica-
tion) is the property whereby one party is assured that no other party aside from
a specifically identified second party (and possibly additional identified trusted
parties) may gain access to a particular secret key (12.2.1). Key confirmation
is the property whereby one party is assured that a second party actually has
possession of a particular secret key (12.2.1). Explicit key authentication is the
property obtained when both (implicit) key authentication and key confirmation
hold (12.2.1).
A further property, desirable in some practical applications but not discussed
in [1], is key freshness. By this we mean the property that the party to a key
establishment process knows that the key is a ‘new’ key. In particular, the party
should have evidence that the messages received during the protocol by which
the key has been established are ‘fresh’ messages, i.e. they are not replays of
‘old’ messages from a previous instance of the protocol.
To see why this property is necessary in addition to implicit or explicit key
authentication, consider the following very simple one-pass key establishment
protocol. In this protocol we suppose that A and B share a long term secret key




where eK(X) denotes the encryption of data string X using key K, IB is an
identifier for party B and —— denotes concatenation of data items. Note that we
suppose here that the encryption algorithm also provides message integrity and
origin authentication (e.g. by additionally computing a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) using a variant of K — see, for example, [1]).
This protocol clearly provides (implicit) key authentication to B, given that
we assume that K is known only to A and B. It also provides key confirmation
to B, since the inclusion of IB means that the message originates from A, and
hence A must know Ks. However it should be clear that the protocol does not
provide key freshness, since B has no way of telling whether the message has
just been generated by A, or is a replay of a message sent by A at any time
since K was first established. Of course, this lack of key freshness can easily be
rectified by including a time stamp or sequence number within the scope of the
encrypted message.
The absence of key freshness would enable an interceptor to force B to keep
re-using an ‘old’ session key, which might have been compromised. It would
therefore seem reasonable to make key freshness a requirement for most appli-
cations of key establishment protocols. In fact it turns out that the absence of
key freshness is a possible source of weakness in the GSM protocol, as we discuss
below.
To conclude this discussion, we note that the two critically important prop-
erties for most key establishment protocols would appear to be (implicit) key
authentication and key freshness. Explicit key authentication is not always so
important, and is, in any case, achieved once a party receives evidence of use of
a key.
3 Case study I: GSM
We start by considering the GSM air interface security features. For a more
detailed discussion of these features see, for example, [2] or [3]. Note that we are
concerned here exclusively with the protocol design for GSM, and not with the
security of the algorithms used; for a summary of the current security status of
the GSM algorithms see, for example, [2].
3.1 Outline of scheme
The GSM air interface authentication protocol, i.e. the security protocol used
across the wireless path between mobile and network, takes place between a
mobile telephone (actually the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) within the
telephone) and the network with which it is currently registered, i.e. the network
which the mobile is using to make and receive calls. This is performed with the
assistance of the mobile user’s ‘home network’, which originally supplied the
SIM. These three entities respectively fit the roles of mobile user, local AAA
server, and home AAA server described above.
The SIM and the home network share a long term secret key, Ki. When
a mobile user first registers with a new network, this network approaches the
home network of the user to request the information necessary to perform the
air interface authentication protocol. This information is provided in the form
of ‘triplets’, (N , R, Kc), where N is a random challenge (or nonce), R is the
expected response to this challenge, and Kc is a secret session key, to be used
to encrypt voice data exchanged between the mobile and the visited network5.
Both R and Kc are computed as functions of N and the long-term secret key
Ki.
To conduct the air interface authentication protocol, the visited network
sends the mobile the challenge N . The mobile uses its stored value of Ki to
compute R and Kc, and sends R back to the network. The network compares
the received value of R with the value in the triple provided by the home network,
and if the two agree then the mobile is deemed to have been authenticated. If
encryption of the air interface link is required (this decision is made by the
network) then the key Kc is used for this purpose.
3.2 Properties of scheme
We provide only a brief analysis of the scheme. For a more detailed analysis see,
for example, [4] or [2].
First observe that the long term secret key Ki is not passed to the visited
network. This to some degree limits the trust required in the visited network.
Also, since the computation of R and Kc from N and Ki is only performed
by the SIM and the home network, the cryptographic algorithms used can be
network specific.
The protocol provides unilateral authentication of the mobile to the local
network. The protocol also provides (implicit) key authentication to the mobile
user, since the key Kc is computed using a long term secret known only to the
SIM and the home network. However, the protocol does not provide key freshness
to the mobile, since the mobile has no way of determining whether N is a ‘fresh’
challenge. Indeed, when the local network has run out of triplets and cannot, for
some reason get access to any more triplets from the home network, it is allowed
to re-use them.
3.3 Analysis
It has been stated on many occasions that the fact that GSM only provides
unilateral authentication, i.e. of mobile to base station but not vice versa, is to
blame for certain known security weaknesses with GSM. These weaknesses have
been widely documented — see, for example, [1, 4]. They include the possibility
of a false base station interposing itself between the genuine base station and
the mobile, and using this to monitor all traffic passing to and from the mobile.
5 N and R are commonly referred to as ‘RAND’ and ‘XRES’/‘SRES’ respectively
However, detailed analysis of these GSM weaknesses reveals that adding base
station authentication to GSM will not necessarily prevent these problems. A
false base station could still insert itself between the mobile and genuine base
station after a mutual authentication process, since there is no integrity protec-
tion for the exchanged traffic. Note also that adding routine integrity protection
to the air interface link would not really be viable, since the air interface link
is subject to a high level of errors. Deleting all traffic containing errors is not
an acceptable strategy, since digitised speech can ‘survive’ a modest number
of transmission errors; that is, enforcing integrity protection would potentially
transform a poor quality but usable speech channel into no channel at all.
In fact, the interposition attack would normally be made pointless by routine
GSM encryption. However, problems arise because the base station instructs the
mobile whether or not to use encryption. A ‘false’ base station can therefore tell
the mobile not to employ encryption, which gives rise to one of the main causes
of weakness in the GSM scheme.
One solution to this problem is to provide integrity protection for certain
security-critical signalling messages sent across the air interface, notably in-
cluding the ‘cipher enable/disable’ messages, and this is precisely the solution
adopted in 3GPP (see below). This integrity protection can be based on the ses-
sion key (or keys) established during the air interface authentication protocol.
This leads us to a second problem with GSM, namely the lack of key freshness
for this protocol already mentioned above.
This lack of key freshness means that if a malicious third party ever obtains a
valid triplet (N , R, Kc) for a mobile, then this can be used to launch an effective
false base station attack without suppressing encryption on the radio path. This
is discussed in more detail in [4].
4 Case study II: 3GPP
We next consider a much more recent air interface authentication protocol, de-
signed as part of the 3GPP system. This protocol, specified in [5], has very
similar objectives to the GSM protocol and, like GSM, is based on secret key
cryptography. In fact, the design of the 3GPP protocol is closely based on the
GSM scheme, taking into account the known problems with the GSM protocol.
4.1 An enhanced GSM protocol
Before giving a description of how 3GPP operates, we give an example of an
‘enhanced’ version of GSM. This example is not a serious proposal for adoption,
but is intended to help explain the details of the 3GPP design, and what could
go wrong if some of the features were not present.
Suppose that the mobile user’s ‘User Services Identity Module’ (USIM), i.e.
the successor to the GSM SIM, is equipped with a sequence number S (initially
set to zero) as well as a long term shared secret Ki. Instead of providing triplets
to the visited network, the home network provides ‘quadruplets’ (N , R, Kc, S),
where N is as before, R and Kc are as before except they are a function of S (as
well as N and Ki), and S is a sequence number. The home AAA server keeps a
record of S for each mobile user, and generates quadruplets with monotonically
increasing sequence numbers. (Note that the same effect can be achieved without
keeping a database of sequence numbers - see, for example, [6]).
To authenticate the mobile, the visited network sends the challenge and serial
number to the mobile (i.e. N and S). As long as S is larger than any previously
received sequence number, the mobile accepts it, updates its stored sequence
number, and computes the response R (and the session key Kc) as a function of
N , S and Ki. This revised protocol now provides key freshness, since the mobile
can check that S is fresh and moreover the session key is a function of S.
To address the other problem with GSM discussed above, a second session
key could also be derived at the same time, and used to protect the integrity
of security-critical signalling messages. By this means the major weaknesses of
GSM could be addressed.
However, there is one major problem with this solution. That is, there is a
trivial and fatally serious denial of service (DoS) attack. An attacker can simply
send a very large (maximal) sequence number S to a mobile, along with an
arbitrary challenge N . The mobile will set its stored sequence number to this
very large value, and will thereafter never accept any more challenges from the
genuine base station. The existence of this DoS attack motivates the slightly
more complex design of the actual 3GPP protocol, which we now describe.
4.2 Outline of 3GPP authentication
As in the ‘enhanced GSM’ protocol, the mobile user’s USIM is equipped with a
sequence number S (initially set to zero) as well as a long term shared secret Ki.
Instead of providing triplets to the visited network, the home network provides
‘6-tuples’ (N , R, Kc, Ka, S, M), where N , R and Kc are as in GSM, Ka is
a second session key derived like Kc as a function of N and Ki (the long term
secret key), S is a sequence number, andM is a MAC computed with data input
a concatenation of N and S, and with secret key input Ki, the long term secret
key6. As above, the home AAA server keeps a record of S for each mobile user,
and generates 6-tuples with monotonically increasing sequence numbers.
To authenticate the mobile, the visited network sends the challenge, serial
number and MAC to the mobile (i.e. N , S and M). The mobile first checks
the MAC. If the MAC verifies correctly, and as long as S is larger than any
previously received sequence number, the mobile accepts it, updates its stored
sequence number, and computes the response R (and the session keys Kc and
Ka) as a function of N and Ki.
6 N , R, Kc, Ka, S and M are commonly referred to as ‘RAND’, ‘XRES’/‘SRES’,
‘CK’, ‘IK’, ‘SQN’ and ‘MAC’ respectively, and the concatenation of S and M is
commonly referred to as ‘AUTN’. Note also that the above is a slightly simplified
description of 3GPP authentication — in the actual scheme the sequence number S
is sent encrypted to prevent it revealing the identity of the mobile user
The 3GPP protocol provides key freshness, since the mobile can check that
S is fresh and moreover the challenge N is ‘bound’ to S by the MAC M . Thus,
since the session keys are functions of N , they are also guaranteed to be fresh.
The session key Kc is used to encrypt data sent across the channel (just as
in GSM) and Ka is used in parallel to protect the integrity of security-critical
signalling messages. By this means the major weaknesses of GSM are addressed.
4.3 Properties of the 3GPP protocol
The 3GPP protocol clearly does not suffer from the DoS attack to which the
‘enhanced GSM’ protocol is prone, because of the presence of the MAC M .
The ‘false base station in the middle’ problems are removed by providing data
integrity and data protection for security-critical signalling messages from the
base station to the mobile, including the message to enable encryption (this latter
message is mandatory, so simply deleting it will not be an effective attack).
It is also worth noting that providing integrity protection for signalling mes-
sages without simultaneously providing key freshness would not be sufficient to
deal with attacks arising from compromise of old session keys.
Finally note that it is the provision of key freshness combined with signalling
integrity, not local network authentication, that prevents the false base station
attacks to which GSM is prone. Nevertheless, and unlike GSM, mutual authen-
tication is provided in 3GPP. This is because the inclusion of a MAC in the
message sent to the mobile from the network enables the mobile to authenticate
the source of the message, and the sequence number enables the message to be
checked for freshness.
This would appear to undermine the main thesis of this paper, i.e. that
mutual entity authentication is not always necessary. However we claim that
the provision of network authentication to the mobile in 3GPP is essentially an
accident. That is, it is provided only as an accidental by-product of the provision
of other necessary security services. To support, this claim, first observe that the
‘enhanced GSM’ protocol in Section 4.1 does potentially deal with the main GSM
problems, as long as it is used in conjunction with signalling integrity - the only
problem with this protocol is the ‘new’ issue of a serious DoS attack. Secondly,
in the next section we present a protocol which meets all the requirements of the
3GPP scenario without providing authentication of the network to the mobile
and which is not prone to a DoS attack.
4.4 Other remarks
In fact there are additional advantages of the 3GPP protocol structure (as com-
pared to the ‘enhanced GSM’ protocol), specific to the 3GPP operational en-
vironment. One potential advantage of sending the MAC M (apart from DoS
prevention) is that it avoids the need to use S in calculating the session keys.
This might be important for GSM/3G interoperation. In the 3GPP protocol,
where the session keys are based on N and the long term secret Ki only, the
GSM authentication triplet can be derived from the 3G authentication 6-tuple
by simply ignoring S and M , and using a simple conversion function to derive a
64-bit GSM Kc from the two 128-bit keys Kc and Ka. This is important because
dual mode mobiles will have to work in GSM networks which cannot handle 3G
authentication 6-tuples.
One other reason for the MACM is that it can be used to protect the ‘AMF’
field. AMF is an undefined data string concatenated with S which may be used
for operator specific commands to the card.
5 Case study III: 3GPP-like protocols
We now briefly consider another 3GPP-like protocol. The main motivation for
presenting this protocol is to show that the distinction between the need for
specific properties for an established key and mutual authentication is real. In
particular, because 3GPP provides mutual authentication, the suspicion might
arise that the only way in which key freshness and key authentication can sensibly
be obtained is to use a mutual entity authentication protocol.
The mobile user’s USIM is here assumed to possess a clock synchronised to
the clock of the network, as well as a long term shared secret Ki. Instead of
providing 6-tuples to the visited network, the home network provides ‘5-tuples’
(N , R, Kc, Ka, T ), where N and R are as in 3GPP, Ka and Kc are derived as a
function of N , T and Ki (the long term secret key), and T is a timestamp. This
scheme requires 5-tuples to be used within a short period of their generation, as
the mobile will check that T is current.
To authenticate the mobile, the visited network sends the challenge and
timestamp to the mobile (i.e. N and T ). The mobile first checks the times-
tamp to see if is within the ‘window of acceptance’. If so, the mobile accepts it
and computes the response R (and the session keys Kc and Ka) as a function of
N , T and Ki.
The 3GPP protocol provides key freshness, since the mobile can check that
T is fresh and moreover the session keys are functions of T . Just as in 3GPP, the
session key Kc is used to encrypt data sent across the channel (just as in GSM)
and Ka is used in parallel to protect the integrity of security-critical signalling
messages. Finally, this scheme is not prone to the DoS attack, since the mobile
will not reset its clock.
However, the protocol clearly does not enable the mobile to authenticate the
network. Thus clearly entity authentication is not always required in order to
establish key freshness and key authentication. However, this protocol is not a
serious candidate for use in the 3GPP scenario, since assuming synchronised
clocks (and the accompanying management overhead) is not reasonable in this
environment.
6 Future systems
One issue which we have not examined in detail here is the fact that, in any
mobile user scenario, there would appear to be a need to delegate some ac-
cess security functions from the ‘home’ AAA server to the visited network AAA
functionality. The question remains open as to how best this should be done,
especially bearing in mind possible anonymity requirements and trust issues.
(Anonymity is an issue partially dealt with by GSM, and more thoroughly pro-
vided by 3GPP, but is beyond the scope of this paper).
Exactly what security services are really required for which protocols, in
particular is mutual authentication a genuine requirement, and how much of the
provision of these services should be delegated to the visited network? Whilst
3GPP might provide a model for a solution based on symmetric cryptography,
how should we solve the same types of problem using asymmetric cryptographic
techniques? This latter question appears to be of importance, because of the
advantages to be gained from the use of public key techniques in scenarios where
the number of entities proliferates, and there is no single model for establishing
bilateral trust relationships, e.g. as in the PANA workgroup scenarios.
7 Concluding remarks
By considering a number of example protocols, we have provided evidence for
the view that entity authentication is not always an essential precursor for the
establishment of secure communications. In the case of GSM, it is often claimed
that the lack of mutual entity authentication is the source of certain well known
problems. However, it is clear that not only is this not the case, but also mutual
authentication on its own will not solve the problems.
We have further argued that, in the typical case, the most important issue is
to ensure that the properties of (implicit) key authentication and key freshness
are provided for any established session keys. These session keys can be used
to protect the integrity of security-sensitive data exchanged during the session,
thereby preventing ‘man in the middle’ attacks.
Of course, key freshness can be obtained ‘for free’ if the key establishment
process is embedded within a mutual entity authentication protocol. Indeed, it
is this fact that may perhaps be responsible for the fact that the issue of key
freshness is not widely discussed in the literature examining key establishment
protocols (notably it is omitted from the discussion in [1]). However, the impor-
tance of the key freshness property means that, if protocols are designed which
do not provide mutual authentication, then it is vital that the provision of key
freshness is carefully checked.
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